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Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously
Peter H. Schuckt
Probably no principle in immigration law is more firmly es-
tablished, or of greater antiquity, than the plenary power of the
federal government to regulate immigration.1 Equally canonical
is the corollary notion, analogous to the dormant power doctrine
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, that this federal power is
indivisible and therefore the states may not exercise any part of
it without an express or implied delegation from Washington.
Despite the plenary power doctrine's authority, it has been
assailed over the years by many academics and defended, I
think, by none. Questioning its source in the Constitution, fit
with other bodies of law, institutional implications, internal co-
herence, specific applications, and policy merits, critics have
called for abandoning or significantly limiting it.2 Its detractors
have also criticized the doctrine's failure to clarify how power is
allocated between Congress and the President in situations
where they disagree.
An interesting feature of these critiques of the plenary power
doctrine is that the critics seem to have no difficulty accepting its
t Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale University. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the contributions of Krishanti Vignarajah, Yale Law School class of 2008, who
provided excellent research assistance, and the participants in a faculty workshop at
Fordham Law School.
1 Chae Chan Ping v United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 US 581, 603
(1889) ("That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy."); Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 722 (1893) ('The
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the govern-
ment of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion, the right to its exercise at any time . .. cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of any one."), quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 US at 609.
2 See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
Colum L Rev 1 (1984); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Ple-
nary Congressional Power, 1984 S Ct Rev 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After
a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
100 Yale L J 545 (1990); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 Hastings Const L Q
1087 (1995); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response
to 'Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 Georgetown Immg L J 289 (2000).
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corollary-the principle that federal authority over immigration
preempts the states from playing any independent role in the
development and administration of immigration law and policy.
Indeed, they enthusiastically affirm and defend it. This conjunc-
tion of positions, which might otherwise seem illogical or at least
awkward, is probably best explained by ideology and politics. As
I have explained elsewhere, the immigration law professoriate
occupies a position at the extreme left in the national debate over
immigration. 3
3 In a polity in which only 7 percent of the public think that immigration levels
should be higher while 55 percent think they should be lower, see
<http://www.galluppol.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1660> (last visited June 9, 2007) (poll
taken in mid-January 2007), one would expect that at least some legal scholars who write
about immigration issues would favor restriction. But one would be wrong. In over two
decades of immersion in immigration scholarship, I have not encountered a single aca-
demic specialist on immigration law who favors reducing the number of legal immigrants
admitted each year. (I myself favor higher admissions, albeit with a greater emphasis on
skills than in the existing system.) This virtual unanimity among academics in favor of
expanded immigration is a striking element of the political disconnect that I have dis-
cussed elsewhere. See Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect between Public Attitudes and
Policy Outcomes in Immigration, in Carol M. Swain, ed, The Politics of Immigration Re-
form 41 (Cambridge 2007).
In earlier works, I defined restrictionism and expansionism in terms not only of
attitudes about legal admissions but also of attitudes about how rigorous enforcement
against the undocumented should be. Here too, immigration law scholars tend to be ex-
pansionist. While they acknowledge the large and steadily growing number of undocu-
mented aliens in the U.S. (after all, only willful blindness could miss this elephant in the
room), few if any favor either an intensive campaign to apprehend and remove the un-
documented or an enhancement of ICE's effective power to do so. (This is not a question of
legal authority, which is already ample.)
With very few exceptions who are footnoted in The Disconnect between Public Atti-
tudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration, I cannot recall any immigration law scholar
expressing support recently for increasing workplace raids, beefing up the Border Patrol,
building a wall on the border, encouraging public officials or private individuals to iden-
tify illegal immigrants to ICE, penalizing those who provide sanctuary to them, using
state and local police to augment ICE, limiting the procedural rights available to asylum
claimants at the border or immigrants in enforcement proceedings, increasing penalties
for illegal entry or visa violations, sanctioning lawyers who seek to delay proceedings to
remove their clients, extending the period during which aliens can be detained either
before or after a final removal order is issued, denying amnesty to undocumented work-
ers, or limiting automatic birthright citizenship for their children.
Many immigration law scholars, of course, do favor using ICE's existing authority
and resources more effectively to reduce illegal migration. They correctly note, for exam-
ple, that the agency seldom imposes serious penalties on employers who rely on facially
valid but frequently forged identification documents in hiring foreign workers, that ICE's
actual follow-up on final removal orders is notoriously haphazard and feckless, that its
management and information systems remain obsolete and chaotic, and that it exhibits
many other chronic deficiencies and injustices.
This is not the place to debate the merits of expansion, much less of the numerous
specific reform measures about which reasonable people can and do differ. Rather, my
point here is simply that in sharp contrast to the American public generally, virtually all
immigration law scholars, like all immigrant advocacy groups and all lawyers who repre-
sent immigrants, strongly support an immigration policy that is expansive in almost
every sense. That is, they favor high and higher levels of legal admissions, generous am-
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In this article, I make the case for a more robust role for the
states in certain areas of immigration policy. In Part I, I contro-
vert the assumption, almost universal among immigration law
scholars, that the states are more hostile to immigrants, both
documented and undocumented, than is Congress. Part II con-
siders how Congress might delegate greater responsibility to the
states, specifically in the areas of employment-based admissions,
immigration enforcement, and employer sanctions, to strengthen
federal immigration policy. Part III considers the validity of re-
cently enacted state laws that directly affect immigrants but that
Congress has not expressly authorized. I maintain that such
laws should be upheld by the courts so long as they reflect a le-
gitimate state interest and do not interfere with the goals of fed-
eral immigration policy, properly and conventionally understood.
I. THE MYTH OF GREATER STATE HOSTILITY TO IMMIGRANTS
Academic opponents of a state role in immigration, being ar-
dently pro-immigration (as am I; I consider myself a moderate
expansionist), fear that to the extent that state authority is rec-
ognized in this field either by Congress or by the courts, the
states (or their localities, if authorized) will adopt restrictive
policies designed to harm the interests of legal aliens and espe-
cially of undocumented ones. The latter group is one for which
these academics, despite their firm professional dedication to the
rule of law, exhibit a remarkable, if understandable, solicitude. 4
But the situation becomes considerably more complex if one
considers the now-conventional distinction between immigration
law and policy (concerned with admission, administration of fed-
nesties for undocumented workers, reduced detention of the undocumented, more liberal
grants of asylum, and more extensive procedural rights for the undocumented that make
it harder for the government to remove them. I cannot recall a single academic presenter
at any program in the more than twenty years of the Immigration Law Section of the
American Association of Law Schools who did not take these positions. More specula-
tively, but based on my participation in many academic conversations and conferences, I
imagine that the vast majority of immigration law scholars also support substantive
entitlements (economic and welfare rights and even some voting rights) to equalize the
status of citizens and noncitizens. It is here, presumably, that the political disconnect
over immigration policy becomes most stark. See id.
4 See, for example, Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants, Preemption and Equality, 35 Va J
Intl L 179, 186 n25 (1994) (emphasis in original); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terror-
ist, 49 UCLA L Rev 1575 (2002), Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign
Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 Va J Intl L 217 (1994); Susan M.
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 NYU Ann Surv Am L 295 (2002). For one
exception, see Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Author-
ity of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 Alb L Rev 179 (2005).
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eral immigration benefits, and enforcement, including removal)
and immigrant law and policy (concerned with how immigrants
are treated once they are admitted or, in the case of the undocu-
mented, otherwise enter the U.S.). 5 Yet it is far from clear that
states not constrained by the plenary power doctrine and its pre-
emption corollary would treat legal immigrants more harshly
than the federal government does (or would), or more harshly
than reasonable (that is, non-xenophobic) voters might think
wise or fair. Some states (or more likely, localities) might do so, 6
of course, but the evidence strongly suggests that the largest
immigrant-receiving states, as well as some states, are in fact
consistently more generous to immigrants, even including un-
documented ones, than is Congress. 7 Whether the 2006 congres-
sional election results will alter this suggestion remains to be
seen.
8
The post-1996 behavior of the states confirms this point.
Anxieties over whether states would follow the federal govern-
ment's lead in restricting public benefits for immigrants after its
1996 immigration reforms were assuaged when many states en-
acted new welfare programs to address the needs of illegal immi-
grants residing within their borders. One concern, for example,
stemmed from the fact that the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") 9 permitted
states to deny most general welfare benefits to immigrants. As of
1999, however, many states had not exercised this option to
make immigrants ineligible, and an Urban Institute paper as-
5 Bosniak, 35 Va J Intl L at 186 n 25 (cited in note 4).
6 See note 86.
7 George J. Borjas, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Immigrant Welfare Use (Center
for Immigration Studies Mar 2002), available at <http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/
borjas2.htm> (last visited Feb 26, 2007) ("The Urban Institute's index of 'welfare generos-
ity' classifies states into four categories according to the availability of the state safety
net. The states where such aid was 'most available' included California and Illinois; the
states where the aid was 'somewhat available' included New York and Florida; the states
where the aid was 'less available' included Arizona and Michigan; and the states were the
aid was 'least available' included Ohio and Texas. It is worth noting that five of the six
states with the largest immigrant populations tended to provide above-average levels of
state-funded assistance to immigrants (the exception being Texas).").
8 See, for example, Randal C. Archibold, Democratic Victory Raises Spirits of Those
Favoring Citizenship for Illegal Aliens, NY Times A27 (Nov 10, 2006) (noting that accord-
ing to the Federation for American Immigration Reform, six state ballot initiatives, in-
cluding four in Arizona, were approved that would make "life harder on illegal immi-
grants"); Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Lawmakers Put New Focus on Illegal Immigration,
NY Times A22 (Nov 16, 2006) (discussing bills filed in Texas to "deny public assistance
and other benefits to the children of illegal immigrants").
9 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub L
No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996), codified in scattered sections of 8, 26, and 42 USC.
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sessing state immigration reform concluded: "Despite fears of a
race to the bottom with states providing as few benefits as possi-
ble, nearly every state has opted to maintain TANF [Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families] and Medicaid eligibility for im-
migrants who were already in the United States when the fed-
eral welfare law passed."10 Indeed, a survey of state welfare pro-
grams in areas ranging from food stamps to health care insur-
ance found that the majority of states had passed at least one
new state welfare program including immigrants after the 1996
Act.1' In January 2007, newly re-elected Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger proposed to extend state-subsidized health in-
surance to the 6.5 million uninsured in California, including the
millions of undocumented immigrants in the state. 12
The situation with driver's licenses and in-state tuition
benefits also supports my claim that many states are more gen-
erous than Congress toward both legal and undocumented immi-
grants. Despite the REAL ID Act of 2005, which bars states from
issuing driver's licenses or identification cards to most undocu-
mented workers, 13 eight states continue to issue driver's licenses
to residents regardless of their immigration status. Forty-seven
states require a Social Security number of those immigrants who
have been assigned one or are eligible for one before issuing
identification. Many of these states, however, do require legal
residence as well, and a growing number of states are calling for
10 Wendy Zimmermann and Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance
for Immigrants Under Welfare Reform 3 (The Urban Institute 1999), available at
<http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/occ24.pdf> (last visited Feb 27, 2007). Their study
showed that two years after the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act ("PRWORA") went into effect in 1996, every state except Alabama continued
to provide Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits to immigrants who entered
pre-PRWORA. Id at 22. See also Welfare Reform: Many States Continue Some Federal or
State Benefits for Immigrants (United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") 1998),
available at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998he98132.pdf> (last visited Dec 5, 2006).
For an argument, and prediction, similar to mine, see Peter J. Spiro, Federalism and
Immigration: Models and Trends, 167 Intl Social Sciences J 67, 71-72 (2001) (noting that
most states responded to PRWORA "with generous eligibility criteria for aliens"); Peter J.
Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 Conn L Rev 1627, 1628, 1640-
46 (1997) ("[Tlhe prospect of a race to the bottom is slight.").
11 Zimmermann and Tumlin, Patchwork Policies at 22-23 ('Regarding four key bene-
fits-(1) a food stamp substitute for immigrants losing food stamps, (2) an SSI substitute
for immigrants losing SSI eligibility, (3) TANF to post-enactment immigrants during the
five-year bar, and (4) Medicaid to the same group-28 states have opted to use their own
funds to provide at least one, 15 at least two, 10 at least three, and two (California and
Maine) all four.").
12 Editorial, Family Values, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B8 (Jan 16, 2007). For a general
discussion of the plan, see Jerry Geisel, California Mulls Universal Health Care, Business
Insurance 1 (Jan 15, 2007).
13 Pub L 109-13, 119 Stat 231, codified at 49 USC § 30301 (2005).
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the REAL ID Act's repeal. 14 Admittedly, however, in some states
like California, initial successes in relaxing the Act's documenta-
tion requirements ultimately suffered serious setbacks. 15
States' willingness to provide even costly public benefits for
immigrants, including undocumented ones, has grown. As of late
2006, ten states-Texas, California, Utah, Washington, New
York, Oklahoma, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico--
had passed laws permitting certain undocumented students who
have attended and graduated from their primary and secondary
schools to pay the same tuition as their classmates at public in-
stitutions of higher education. 16 This statistic is even more re-
markable because these are the states in which most undocu-
mented immigrants live.' 7 An article published in 2005 found
14 Overview of States' Driver's License Requirements (National Immigration Law
Center Jan 2007), available at <http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/state dljrqrmts_
ovrvw_2007-01-31.pdf> (last visited Feb 26, 2007). Telephone conversation with Tyler
Moran, Employment Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center (Jan 30, 2007).
See Eric Lipton, Rebellion Growing as States Challenge a Federal Law to Standardize
Driver's Licenses, NY Times A16 (Feb 5, 2007) ("Opposition among state officials is turn-
ing into an open revolt" against the law). The Maine legislature, the first to call for the
repeal of the Act and also to refuse to implement it, claims that it will cost the state $185
million to administer and create other problems. Maine: Repeal of Federal ID Law is
Sought, NY Times A19 (Jan 26, 2007).
15 On September 5, 2003, California Governor Gray Davis signed a bill allowing ille-
gal immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. Peter Nicholas and Jennifer Mena, Bill Allow-
ing Illegal Immigrants to Get Driver's Licenses Is Signed, LA Times B1 (Sept 6, 2003). But
Governor Schwarzenegger subsequently repealed the driver's license law after taking
office. Erin Kragh, Forging a Common Culture: Integrating California's Illegal Immigrant
Population, 24 BC Third World L J 373, 387-88 (2004).
16 See Kathleen A. Connolly, In Search of the American Dream: An Examination of
Undocumented Students, In-State Tuition, and the Dream Act, 55 Cath U L Rev 193, 208
(2005); Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act, and Undocumented College Student
Residency, 30 J Coll & Univ L 435, 456 (2004) (citing California, Illinois, New York,
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington as states allowing undocumented students to
pay resident tuition fees); Basic Facts about In-State Tuition for Undocumented Immi-
grant Students 1 (National Immigration Law Center Apr 2006), available at
<http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/DREAMin-statetuitionbasicfacts_041706.pdf> (last
visited Feb 26, 2007). New Mexico, for example, entitled immigrants to in-state tuition
benefits: "Any tuition rate or state-funded financial aid that is granted to residents of
New Mexico shall also be granted on the same terms to all persons, regardless of immi-
gration status, who have attended a secondary educational institution in New Mexico for
at least one year and who have either graduated from a New Mexico high school or re-
ceived a general educational development certificate in New Mexico." NM Stat Ann § 21-
1-4.6 (Michie 2005). As of August 2007, Congress was actively considering a federal
Dream Act, which would create a path to citizenship for undocumented high school
graduates under certain conditions. See Julia Preston, In Increments, Senate Revisits Its
Immigration Bill, NY Times Al (Aug 3, 2007).
17 Connolly, 55 Cath U L Rev at 209 (cited in note 16). In fact, in 2000, about 4.5
million of the 7.0 million unauthorized residents in the United States lived in California,
Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida (the only state among the five that did not enact
legislation to provide in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants). Id at 209 n 115.
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that many other states, including Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, and Tennessee, were con-
sidering similar legislation.18 (The question of the constitutional-
ity of these laws remains uncertain.) 19
Many of the leading immigration destination cities in the
U.S. have expressly affirmed their solidarity with immigrants,
including undocumented ones, by adopting policies instructing
their officials to refrain from assisting or cooperating with fed-
eral immigration officials 2 0 -this, in the face of a federal statu-
tory provision prohibiting any official from restricting informa-
tion exchange with federal officials concerning an individual's
immigration status.21 State attorneys general have aggressively
sought to protect immigrant workers, even when it has put them
at odds with federal immigration policy. Some attorneys general
have gone beyond quietly flouting that policy as well. Massachu-
setts Attorney General Thomas Reilly, for example, has sought to
protect illegal aliens who are especially vulnerable to employer
abuse even while the INS actively sought to prosecute them. 22
18 Id at 209 n 117.
19 This question is under active litigation in California. Robert Martinez, et al v Re-
gents of the University of California, et al, CV05-2064, pending before the Third District
Court of Appeals for the State of California (lower court decision by Yolo County Court
Judge Thomas Warriner, 2006). The legal issue is whether these state tuition policies
comply with § 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Reconciliation Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA"), which provides that an unlawfully present alien"shall not be eligible on
the basis of residence within a State ... for any postsecondary education benefit unless a
citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit.., without regard to
whether the citizen or national is such a resident." Compare Michael A. Olivas, A Rebut-
tal to FAIR, Univ Bus 72 (June 2002) (arguing that the non-monetary "benefit actually
being conferred by residency statutes is the right to be considered for in-state resident
status" which is outside of IIRIRA), with Dan Stein, Why Illegal Immigrants Should Not
Receive In-State Tuition Subsidies, Univ Bus 64 (Apr 2002) ("Preferential treatment for
illegal immigrants in public education is unlawful."). Consider also Michael A. Olivas, 30
J Coll & Univ L at 452-57 (2004) (cited in note 15) (concluding that IIRIRA, "however
badly written, allows states to confer (or not to confer) a residency benefit upon the un-
documented in their public postsecondary institutions").
20 See, for example, John M. Morganelli, Sanctuary City Ordinances Make Nation
Less Safe, The Morning Call (Allentown, PA) A15 (Dec 8, 2006) ("Cities such as Los Ange-
les, New York, Chicago, Austin, San Diego and Houston are a few examples of cities
which prevent police officers from inquiring as to immigration violations of suspected
illegal aliens."); California: City Won't Aid Immigration Officials, NY Times A23 (Apr 24,
2007).
21 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"),
Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996), Section 642, codified at 8 USC § 1373(a) (2000).
22 Immigrant Workers' Civil Rights a Challenge for Attorney General, The Standard-
Times A6 (New Bedford, MA) (Apr 21, 2001). ("Jeremy Banks, a representative of Attor-
ney General Thomas Reilly, has made dozens of appearances across the state - one in
Freetown this week - trying to encourage illegal aliens to report abuse they suffer at the
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New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, while state Attorney General,
did much the same.23 In June 2007, the city of New Haven, Con-
necticut apparently became the first city in the nation to issue
municipal identification cards to undocumented immigrants in
order to give them better access to city services and help the po-
lice protect them from crime. 24 These actions bespeak a remark-
able solicitude by public officials for both legal and undocu-
mented immigrants in many receiving states and communities.
Recent reports suggest that the same is true of the private sector
and community groups. 25
But even if this solicitude were less robust than it is, an im-
migration policy that allocates regulatory power over immigra-
tion and immigrants between the federal government and the
states on the basis of general, politically acceptable principles
would be more desirable than a policy that simply favors which-
ever power allocation one or another commentator thinks might
yield the most social services and welfare benefits for immi-
grants. In the discussion that follows, I invoke one such broader
principle, functional rationality, to argue that the legitimate
goals of federal immigration policy might be better served by rec-
ognizing state authority in certain areas. In Part II, I shall focus
on three specific policy areas: employment-based admissions,
integration with state and local criminal justice systems, and
employer sanctions. I shall assume that state authority would be
rooted in an express delegation of authority by Congress or, ab-
sent such an express delegation, would nevertheless be affirmed
by the courts against a challenge based on federal exclusivity or
preemption.
hands of employers.... [T]he attorney general wants to know about it and he wants to
help stop it.").
23 Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys
General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 Colum J L & Soc Probs 495, 540-41
(2006) (describing Spitzer's intervention where state courts "had held that federal immi-
gration law preempts undocumented workers from receiving lost earning recoveries based
on wages earned domestically in common-law tort and state statutory worker-safety
actions").
24 Jennifer Medina, New Haven Approves Program To Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs,
NY Times B6 (June 5, 2007).
25 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Big Banks' Loan Push: Illegal Immigrants, Wall St J C1
(May 3, 2007); Miriam Jordan, Illegal Residents Get Legal Route to Car Coverage, Wall St
J Al (May 1, 2007); James Barron, Churches To Offer Sanctuary, NY Times B1 (May 9,
2007). See also Julia Preston, Immigration Is at Center Of New Laws Around U.S.,
NY Times A12 (Aug 6, 2007) (discussing National Conference of State Legislatures
report on 170 new statutes, some of which seek to help the undocumented by protect-
ing them from exploitation and extending education and health care to their chil-
dren).
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The questions I address are, first, what would be the conse-
quences of such an express delegation, and second, under what
conditions would and should the courts affirm state authority in
these three policy areas absent such a delegation.
To my knowledge, only one scholar, Peter Spiro, has ad-
vanced an extended defense of a larger role for the states in the
immigration context. 26 In an intriguing 1994 article, Spiro noted
that immigration had become a prominent political issue in some
high-impact states, and that "[a]s a practical matter, immigra-
tion is now largely a state-level concern. ''27 Audaciously, Spiro
argued that "existing constraints on state measures relating to
undocumented aliens can be justified only by way of foreign af-
fairs preemption," and that this preemption should be abandoned
in light of the growing and often independent role of the states
("demi-sovereigns," in Spiro's terminology) in "a post-national
world order."28 If Congress wishes to preempt or constrain state
measures, he maintained, it should do so expressly; absent that,
the courts should not do it for them.
In the course of developing his argument, Spiro criticizes the
two other doctrines that courts have used to limit state policies
that affect immigrants: the prohibition against state laws that in
effect deny legally-admitted immigrants "entrance and abode,"
and the application of equal protection doctrine to bar state laws
that discriminate against aliens but that do not offend other con-
stitutional provisions. To the extent that such state laws do not
violate international law standards, Spiro would uphold them
unless Congress expressly provides otherwise.
My legal argument is narrower and less ambitious than
Spiro's, but my functional analysis may actually have broader
policy implications. It is important to recall an essential but of-
ten overlooked fact about American public policy and governmen-
tal structure: the "federalist default" arrangement is for federal
programs to rely, often heavily, on state and local involvement,
including in the enforcement of federally-promulgated rules. In-
26 See also Cristina Rodriguez, Immigration Reform Has to Start on the Street, News-
day A44 (Long Island, NY) (July 23, 2006) (op-ed urging more attention to the state and
local role in managing effects of immigration).
27 Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va
J Intl L 121 (1994). See also Peter J. Spiro, 29 Conn L Rev 1627 (cited in note 10).
28 Spiro, 35 Va J Intl L at 123 (cited in note 27). I agree with the position of both
Michael Olivas and Hiroshi Motomura that generally speaking, and contrary to Spiro,
sound arguments exist for federal preemption unrelated to the foreign affairs power.
Michael A. Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 234-36 (cited in note 4); Hiroshi Motomura, Immi-
gration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 Va J Intl L 201 (1994).
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deed, it is hard to think of a national program (other than Social
Security) that is run entirely by the federal government without
any state involvement. Even national defense incorporates the
state national guards. This enforcement-sharing default is all the
more significant when one considers that in the vast majority of
these policy domains where Congress delegates federal authority
downward, Congress could if it wished exercise plenary federal
authority without any constitutional impediment.
For present purposes, then, the fundamental question that
this federalist default raises is this: why should immigration be
different? My answer, supported in the analysis that follows, is
that in principle immigration should not be different, though the
precise mix of federal and state authority and responsibility is
and must always be domain-specific. 29
Before proceeding, I briefly defend my use of the term "im-
migration federalism." Some federalist arrangements are based
on the sovereignty of the states. That is, state authority inheres
in the constitutional settlement among the states and the people,
whereby only limited powers (later vastly expanded) were dele-
gated to the national government while all other powers were
reserved to the states and the people. This is not the species of
federalism that I have in mind here. Although contemporary fed-
eralism and the jurisprudence that surrounds it are certainly
influenced by such notions of constitutional state sovereignty,
many if not most of the powers exercised by the states today are
undertaken pursuant to a bewilderingly complex system of fed-
eral-state relationships in which the states participate in pro-
grams enacted and largely funded by Washington. 30 This state
participation can take many different forms: administration
and/or enforcement of federally-established rules and policies;
policy development and implementation within parameters
(more or less constraining) set by federal policymakers; federal
funding of states to develop their own policies; and many other
collaborative (though inevitably conflicting) arrangements. What
I refer to as immigration federalism, then, consists of arrange-
29 In the importance of domain-specificity and case-by-case application of preemption
doctrine, I agree with Michael Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L 217 (cited in note 4), but we disagree
on whether the doctrine precludes states from acting in the ways I support below.
30 See generally, Martha Derthick, America's Federalism, in Peter H. Schuck and
James Q. Wilson, eds, Understanding America: The Institutions and Policies that Shape
America and the World (forthcoming 2008).
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ments, such as these, in which the states operate under, and are
obliged to respect, federal immigration policies and supervision.31
II. DELEGATING MORE IMMIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION AUTHORITY TO THE STATES
A federal system allocates public authority between the na-
tional government and sub-national entities, but this allocation
differs according to the nature of the allocation and the specific
policy domain. In the U.S., as noted earlier, the plenary power
doctrine and its dormant power corollary leave immigration pol-
icy as the sole responsibility of the federal government, subject
only to such delegations of immigration authority to the states as
Congress may choose to make. Spiro insists that this federal mo-
nopoly over immigration is rooted entirely in the exclusive fed-
eral authority over foreign relations, captured in the (anachro-
nistic, in Spiro's view) "one voice" metaphor. 32 Surely that is the
chief rationale for the doctrine, but it is not the only one. For ex-
ample, appeals to tradition and the sunk costs of the status quo
may also militate in favor of federal authority over immigration.
But advocates of exclusive federal power almost always have
other, more functional arguments to make against decentraliza-
tion: a desire for uniformity, increasing returns to regulatory
scale, administrative expertise and competence, fear of "races to
the bottom," and others. (There are, of course, important, often
decisive, political arguments for decentralization.)
It is all the more striking, then, that some major immigrant-
receiving nations delegate (or reserve) substantial authority over
certain significant aspects of immigration policy to their states
(Germany (Lander) and Australia), provinces (Canada), and can-
tons (Switzerland).3 3 In contrast, the U.S. remains a firm central-
izer in immigration policy despite its robust tradition and struc-
ture-the federalist default-of state authority and administra-
tion in health care, education, national elections, taxation, and
many other policy areas that in other countries are almost en-
31 This conforms to what Peter Spiro, distinguishing three models of immigration
federalism, calls "cooperative federalism." 167 Intl Social Sciences J at 67-68 (cited in
note 10).
32 Spiro, 35 Va J Intl L at 158 (cited in note 27).
33 In another example, China has delegated to Hong Kong significant immigration
policy autonomy. Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy through Separation?: Environmental
Law and the Basic Law ofHong Kong, 39 Harv Intl L J 231, 236 (1998). On decentralized
citizenship decisionmaking, see Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 Am J
Comp L 195 (2000).
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tirely the responsibility of national governments. Why, other
than by virtue of immigration's relation to foreign affairs, should
this exception to the federalist default exist and, more to the
point, why should it be maintained? I explore this question by
focusing on three distinct immigration policy problems where the
states might play an effective role in better achieving national
goals.
A. Employment-Based Admissions
Authority to determine the number of and criteria for ad-
missions is at the very core of immigration policy. Indeed, in
cases challenging the extent of the plenary power doctrine, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever constitutional
limits might exist on that power, they do not apply to decisions
and criteria concerning initial admission and entry.34 Under the
immigration statute, the formulation and implementation of ad-
missions policy are entirely matters for Congress, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the State Department, the Depart-
ment of Labor, and the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices; the states have no significant role.35
Yet there is much to be said for exploiting the diversity
among states with respect to one important immigration stream:
employment-based admissions. Under my supervision, a Yale
Law School student, Davon Collins, has developed a proposal for
what he calls decentralized employment-based immigration
("DEBI").36 The essential premise of the proposal is that em-
ployment-based admissions primarily implicate local economic
interests, particularly local labor markets, and that a decentral-
ized system for deciding which petitioners should receive the fed-
erally-allotted visas-subject to federally-determined quotas and
34 See, for example, Shaughnessy v Mezei, 345 US 206, 212 (1953) ('"Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned."') (quoting Knauff v Shaughnessy, 338 US 537, 544 (1950)); Harisiades v
Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 590 (1952) ("Ve, in our private opinions, need not concur in
Congress' policies to hold its enactments constitutional. Judicially we must tolerate what
personally we may regard as a legislative mistake."); Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 66
(1941) (concluding that the federal government has broad constitutional powers to deter-
mine admissions and naturalization).
35 State employment services do play a role in labor certification decisions, and state
law is the basis for some federal immigration decisions, such as those involving family
law. See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn L Rev
1625 (2007).
36 Davon M. Collins, Towards A More Federalist Employment-Based Immigration
System, 25 Yale L & Pol Rev 349 (2007).
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criteria-would ameliorate many problems that have long
plagued the existing centralized system. Collins analogizes this
approach to the 1996 welfare reform (PRWORA), in which Con-
gress made block grants to the states for use in cash transfers,
job training and support, child welfare, and other services for the
eligible poor. Under DEBI, he says, the federal government
would distribute blocks of visas to the states, not blocks of
money.
In the proposed system, Congress would set the eligibility
standards for employment-based immigrants, the annual na-
tional quotas for as many employment-based subcategories as it
wished to specify, and criteria for state participation, which
would be voluntary. Congress would then distribute visa allot-
ments to participating states in proportion to some index, such
as the state's share of the national working-age population.
Within the overall quotas, and subject to federal rules, states
could buy and sell visa allotments among themselves. 37 If this
market proved too thin, the price could be set by federal law.
Thereafter, each state would decide, in whatever manner it
thought best, which individual petitioners would receive its al-
lotment of visas. Within parameters set by federal law, the states
would be free to regulate visa portability and other aspects of the
immigrant employment relationship. As the trading scheme sug-
gests, a state's power under this system would include the power
to decline to accept any employment-based immigrants at all.
Congress's standards for state participation in the system would
prescribe minimum labor standards, while mitigating race-to-
the-bottom or other spillover effects.
A reform like DEBI would increase the responsiveness of
employment-based admissions to local economic conditions and
priorities. The existing labor certification system, centralized in
the Department of Labor, is notoriously slow, cumbersome, in-
flexible, politicized, manipulable, and ill-suited to a heterogene-
ous, rapidly changing labor market. 38
37 See, for example, analogous schemes in other areas: Peter H. Schuck, Refugee
Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 Yale J Intl L 243 (1997); James S. Shortle and
Richard D. Horan, Water Quality Trading, 14 Penn St Envir L Rev 231, 236-39 (2006)
(discussing "the development of water quality trading policy frameworks at state and
regional levels").
38 See, for example, Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Stephen Yale-Loehr, Balancing
Interests: Rethinking the U.S. Selection of Skilled Immigrants (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 1996); Ruth Ellen Wasem, Labor Certification for Permanent Immi-
grant Admissions (Congressional Research Service 2003), available at <http:I
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=crs> (last vis-
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As an example of how DEBI might improve the situation,
Collins notes that even at the end of the high-tech boom in 2001,
when Congress wanted to reduce the number of H-1B visas, this
surely was not the best solution for all states or regions. While
many states favored a cap, others might have eagerly sought
more of these foreign workers. Still others may have seen the
decline in wages as an opportunity for attracting more techno-
logical investment in their states. Although a state's employ-
ment-based admissions process might simply replicate the pa-
thologies of the current federal labor certification system, it
seems more likely that the relatively few states with low unem-
ployment rates and a high demand for foreign workers would be
more keenly aware of these needs, more eager to fix the problem,
and more nimble in finding ways to do so than the federal gov-
ernment would. 39 Moreover, the burdens imposed by immi-
grants-such as increased demand for public benefits and ser-
vices, and downward pressure on wage rates-are disproportion-
ately felt at the state and local level, which suggests that states
are in the best position to assess and manage the tradeoffs
among conflicting public goals peculiar to their polities. The fed-
eral government, however, must try somehow to integrate 50
different situations into a single one-size-fits-all national policy.
Finally, a less centralized system would let states experiment
with different approaches to these problems without implicating
the national economy or immigration policy.
Recall that this kind of system would be limited to employ-
ment-based visas, would be voluntary on the part of the states,
and would be subject to whatever level of controls Congress
might wish to maintain. Under these circumstances, any disad-
vantages of the system are likely to be isolated, readily moni-
tored, and easily remedied. 40
ited Feb 27, 2007); Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment, Reforming Immigration: Helping Meet America's Need for a Skilled Workforce 21
(Committee for Economic Development 2001). For a critique of a new program, see Labor
Certification: PERM - Program Electronic Review Management (Dornbaum & Peregoy),
available at <http://www.immigrationlawyersnj.com/content/services/perm-res-employ/
1.aspx> (last visited Feb 26, 2007).
39 Peter Spiro notes that Australia and Canada have adopted programs under which
states or provinces are eligible for higher quotas of skilled immigrants under formal
agreements between the central and subnational governments. 167 Intl Social Sciences J
at 70 (cited in note 10).
40 For a very different approach to reforming the admissions system, see Adam B.
Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan L Rev
809 (2007), which compares ex ante (pre-entry characteristics) and ex post (post-entry
conduct) selection processes. It is not clear whether this approach would be possible or
[2007:
TAKING IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM SERIOUSL Y
B. State and Local Enforcement
Whether federal immigration law is under-enforced or over-
enforced depends on one's perspective. Lawyers who represent
immigrants, and others who advocate on their behalf, predictably
view Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officials as
all-powerful. They claim that enforcement is too harsh and indis-
criminate, arousing in the immigrant community unwanted fear,
family breakup, and other forms of individual and communal
dislocation. In support of this claim, they will cite workplace
raids, excessive detention, unwarranted denial of asylum claims,
neighborhood sweeps, Border Patrol abuses, deaths of desperate
border-crossers on the highways and in the desert, removals of
resident aliens for minor and long-ago crimes, and other aggres-
sive enforcement tactics and immigrant hardships.
On the other hand, those favoring more effective enforce-
ment view the immigration agency as feckless, listless, and
toothless, despite its impressive arsenal of legal authority. In
support of this view, they cite the low percentage of illegal aliens
actually removed, their repeated crossings after they are appre-
hended and returned by the Border Patrol, the ease of acquiring
fraudulent documents and unauthorized employment, the high
absconding rates of those not detained pending removal hearings
and of those removable aliens who receive "run letters" from the
agency, the notorious failure to enforce sanctions against em-
ployers who (with a wink and a nod or studied inadvertence) hire
unauthorized workers, the ability of some cities to frustrate fed-
eral enforcement, the reluctance of federal prosecutors to bring
criminal cases against immigrants and even smugglers, the
strong political and economic interests that countenance, protect,
and even promote illegal migration, the long delays that hobble
enforcement proceedings, and many other impediments. 41
I believe that both critiques are accurate: immigration laws
are simultaneously both under- and over-enforced (perhaps most
laws are). I say this even though, as I have argued elsewhere,
some fraction of what we loosely call under-enforcement may in
fact be justified as a matter of policy:
practicable in a decentralized system like DEBI.
41 The publications of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and
its research arm Center for Immigration Studies are replete with such criticisms of the
existing enforcement system.
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Illegal immigration, after all, confers significant benefits
on almost all concerned, while the costs of eliminating it
(in terms of enforcement resources, opportunity costs, civil
liberties, foreign-policy interests, and so on) would be
manifestly prohibitive. This means that the socially opti-
mal level of illegal migration policy that balances its so-
cial benefits and costs is far greater than zero. Indeed, in
a nation of almost 300 million people, the optimal level of
illegal immigration may even exceed today's estimated
level of approximately 11-12 million undocumented resi-
dents, with 250,000 more added each year to the more or
less permanent population.42
But once the government has settled on an appropriate en-
forcement level, society has a compelling interest in seeing that
the enforcement is carried out effectively at that level. For better
and for worse, effective federal immigration enforcement often
depends upon the extensive participation of state and local offi-
cials. This is particularly true regarding enforcement against
immigrants who have been convicted of crimes in this country.
The reason is that identifying, apprehending, arraigning, detain-
ing, processing, and removing these immigrants usually requires
that federal officials look to state and local criminal justice sys-
tems. Specifically, they must rely, often heavily, on state and
local officials, data networks, detention facilities, initiatives, and
tactics. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that where enforce-
ment against criminal aliens is concerned-unquestionably one
of the highest policy priorities-federal immigration officials are
practically impotent without the substantial help of the state and
local criminal justice systems.
In an article published in 2000, a co-author and I described
this dependence in detail and summarized it as follows:
Two important constraints necessitate this reliance. First,
the INS does not determine in the first instance which
aliens are criminals; that is the job of local police and of
prosecutors and judges at all levels of government. Sec-
ond, the INS controls only a tiny fraction of the resources
dedicated nationally to criminal law enforcement. 43
42 Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in Caroline Brettell and James
Hollifield, eds, Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines 249 (Routledge, 2d ed 2007).
43 Peter H. Schuck and John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
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After reviewing this relationship, we proposed a "federalist solu-
tion" to the problem of removing criminal aliens, a solution that
would seek to exploit the respective competences and institutions
of the federal, state, and local systems. Drawing on data for
1998, we showed that the federal government removed fewer
than twenty percent of the criminal aliens who were then under
law enforcement supervision.44 We pointed out that its perform-
ance was even worse than the twenty percent figure suggested,
considering that the vast majority of removable criminal aliens
were at large in the community, either on probation or parole or
free from criminal justice supervision altogether, and that new
immigration flows were constantly replenishing and augmenting
the stock of such aliens. 45
The federal government has steadily increased the number
of criminal alien removals, from 56,000 in fiscal year 1998 to al-
most 89,000 in 2004.46 Although this may seem like an encourag-
ing trend, one must keep it in perspective.47 Even the most re-
cent number almost certainly remains but a small fraction of the
total criminal aliens under criminal justice supervision. (I have
not updated our analysis, particularly the denominator, in order
to determine the precise fraction today, but my guess is that it is
not much higher, and perhaps even lower, than it was in 1998.)
This, despite the fact that, as we demonstrated, these should be
"slam dunk" cases, as these things go. After all, the federal gov-
ernment knows who and where most of these criminal aliens are,
and-because few of them have any valid legal defenses or politi-
cal support-it possesses all the legal authority it needs to re-
move them. 48 Whether it is prepared to allocate the necessary
administrative resources to these removals is a separate ques-
Promises of Federalism, 22 Harv J L & Pub Pol 367, 398 (2000).
44 Id at 384-85.
45 Id at 385.
46 Mary Dougherty, Denise Wilson, and Amy Wu, Immigration Enforcement Actions:
2004 6, available at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Annual
ReportEnforcement2004.pdf> (last visited Mar 3, 2007).
47 The persistent shortcomings.in federal immigration enforcement, which any new
legalization programs will certainly exacerbate, are well-documented. A report published
by the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Homeland Security, for ex-
ample, documents the serious obstacles the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
currently faces and will continue to confront in executing federal immigration policy. See
Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing Information Technology 16 (2006)
("mhese preliminary USCIS assessments and plans have determined that the bureau
currently lacks the processing capacity, systems integration, and project management
resources needed to manage a potential increase in workloads.").
48 Schuck and Williams, 22 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 396-98 (cited in note 43).
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tion, of course, but it is hard to imagine a higher law enforce-
ment priority than this or one that is easier to implement.
We were hardly original in laying out the case for both im-
proving coordination between federal immigration enforcement
and state and local criminal justice systems, and increasing the
authority of the latter to assist in the former. Several years ear-
lier, Congress had endorsed this approach in the 1996 reforms,
authorizing the Attorney General, under § 287(g) of the amended
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), to enter into agree-
ments with qualified state and local officials allowing them (at
their own expense) to carry out investigation, apprehension, and
detention functions for the federal agency. 49 In 2005, Kris Ko-
bach, a former aide to Attorney General John Ashcroft specializ-
ing in immigration issues, summarized the experience under this
new § 287(g) authority, calling it "the quintessential force multi-
plier."50 Kobach, now a law professor, was primarily concerned
with establishing the legal authority of local police to make im-
migration arrests. Kobach showed that this local arrest author-
ity--contrary to the claims of Michael Wishnie, Huyen Pham,
and some other commentators-antedated § 287(g), was rein-
forced by it, and is legally valid. But the arrest authority, as Ko-
bach explained, is only one part of this state and local govern-
ment force multiplier.
The policy wisdom of § 287(g) and, more importantly, of the
memoranda of understanding entered into with states under its
authority, and of the immigration enforcement-related activities
of state and local officials more generally, are of course separate
questions. 51 Gladstein and colleagues have presented the most
thoroughgoing case against a more extensive enforcement role
for state and local officials. In a paper published by the Migra-
tion Policy Institute in December 2005, they identify six grounds
that critics have for opposing such a role: (1) it will damage im-
migrants' safety and civil liberties; (2) it will distract police from
their primary crime-fighting responsibilities; (3) police lack the
necessary training; (4) it will encourage racial profiling; (5) the
National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database contains
much incorrect information; and (6) immigrants, fearing deporta-
49 8 USC § 1357(g) (2000).
50 Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 179 (cited in note 4).
51 For additional discussion of this provision, see Clare Huntington, The Constitu-
tional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 Vand L Rev (forthcoming 2008).
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tion, will be reluctant to cooperate with the police and report in-
formation about crimes. 52
Each of these claims is plausible and must be taken seri-
ously. In particular, reliable empirical data are needed to deter-
mine their accuracy and, if accurate, their policy implications. I
am agnostic about what the data would show. Even absent such
data, however, certain straightforward considerations seem per-
tinent to thinking clearly about any such assessment, and sug-
gest that categorical opposition to the policy presented by Glad-
stein, et al, may go much too far.
First, as just noted, these grounds make factual assertions
about harms that may or may not be true, and whose signifi-
cance, in any event, depends not on the mere possibility of those
harms but on their probability and magnitude at the margin.
Second, the supposed conflict between the crime-fighting respon-
sibilities of state and local police and their work on immigration
cases may be more apparent than real. Where the criminals
whom the police target are also aliens-an all-too common situa-
tion53-there is no diversion of effort. Quite the contrary: a vast
number of convicted criminal aliens are at large because ICE has
failed to remove them, and many other aliens commit crimes that
may warrant state and local policing and prosecution followed by
federal removal.
Third, several of the grounds for objection cite conditions-
lack of adequate training (which would violate § 287(g)(2)), the
possibility of improper profiling, and a flawed database-that do
not imply a rejection of enhanced state and local participation;
rather, they imply the need to rectify those conditions directly
through policy or administrative changes. Fourth, the Gladstein
paper reports an analysis of NCIC immigration hits that found,
among other things, 42 percent false positives overall (where
DHS was unable to confirm that the individual was an immigra-
52 Hannah Gladstein, et al, Blurring the Lines: A Profile of State and Local Police
Enforcement of Immigration Law Using the National Crime Information Center Database,
2002-2004 (Migration Policy Institute 2005).
53 This is obviously true, even though immigrants are no more likely than citizens to
commit crimes. See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Immigrants' Political and Legal Incor-
poration in the United States after 9/11: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, in Jennifer
Hochschild and John Mollenkopf, eds, Immigrant Political Incorporation in the United
States and Europe (Cornell forthcoming) (citing data); Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Mor-
rison Piehl, Recent Immigrants: Unexpected Implications for Crime and Incarceration, 51
Indus Labor Rel Rev 654, 677 (1998) ("Whatever drives the differences in the institution-
alization rates, if natives had the same institutionalization probabilities as immigrants,
our jails and prisons would have one-third fewer inmates.").
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tion violator), with the rate of false positives varying considera-
bly from state to state and with a large majority of the hits being
of people from Latin America, particularly Mexico. 54
Again, this very useful analysis raises some important ques-
tions that only further research could answer. Is 42 percent an
unacceptably high error rate, as Gladstein, et al, suggest, given
that it is only a necessarily crude, first-step screening technique,
not a decision to prosecute or even to investigate particular indi-
viduals? If unacceptable, what would it take, and at what cost, to
reduce the false positive rate to an acceptable level? To what ex-
tent are the false positives an unavoidable consequence of three
facts of life: the confusion that often surrounds Hispanic sur-
names (order of names, retention of maternal surname, and high
frequency of certain name combinations), the heavy use of false
names among criminal aliens, and the inevitable time lags be-
tween getting data (including corrections of inaccurate data) and
entering it into a database? What safeguards against false posi-
tives can be built into the system, without making the level of
false negatives unacceptably high? Perhaps most important, to
what extent is use of the database merely the first step in a se-
quence of screens or investigations, each step more focused and
accurate than the previous one, such that inaccuracies that arise
in early steps are weeded out in later ones?
Fifth, there is the question of immigrant cooperation with
state and local law enforcement officials. Such cooperation is ob-
viously essential to the safety of society in general and of the
communities in which immigrants live and work in particular.
Here, a sound policy assessment would seek answers to ques-
tions like the following: how does greater state and local in-
volvement affect immigrants' cooperation at the margin-that is,
above and beyond their existing concerns about deportation,
which presumably are already significant? How much of a stake
do immigrants have in increasing the effectiveness of law en-
forcement in the overlapping domains of crime and immigration,
given that they are likely to be the principal victims of that
crime? Can state and local officials build on that stake in order to
gain the benefits of their cooperation with the authorities with-
out discouraging that cooperation? What proportion of officials in
communities with large immigrant concentrations in fact oppose
greater state and local participation? Among those officials, how
much of their opposition could be mollified if the programs were
54 Gladstein, et al, Blurring the Lines at 3-4 (cited in note 52).
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improved, how much is unchangeable, and how much simply re-
flects the predictable reluctance of officials asked to shoulder ad-
ditional responsibilities or to change their familiar routines?
Since § 287(g)(9) states that participation by states and localities
is wholly optional, and since one would expect different commu-
nities to feel differently about it, why is opposition by some of
them an argument against the voluntary participation by others?
Sixth, even the irreducible difficulties associated with en-
hanced state and local participation must still be balanced
against whatever benefits to immigrant communities and to soci-
ety at large that such participation generates. These benefits are
surely greater than zero-Kobach cites many examples 55-but
whether they are large enough to justify the costs is ultimately
the pivotal question. In making this assessment, an important-
perhaps even decisive-question, given the incomplete data and
other uncertainties surrounding the analysis, is who should bear
the burden of proof-the proponents of greater state and local
participation authorized by § 287(g) and other programs, or the
opponents of such programs? The fact that Congress and a grow-
ing number of state and local governments have in fact author-
ized these programs 56 might justify shifting this burden of proof
to the opponents-although some will insist that the government
still bears it because, in their view, the risks associated with
such cooperation are simply unacceptable.
Lacking answers to the empirical questions that I have
posed, I cannot be certain what result a policy assessment of
these federal-state programs would reach. I think it unlikely,
however, that it would condemn them categorically, as distin-
guished from concluding, consistent with the federalism default
discussed in Part I, that the programs should be improved in or-
der to minimize any problems that the critics have correctly
identified.57
55 Kobach, 69 Albany L Rev at 183-99 (cited in note 4).
56 Arizona recently announced that it will implement such a program. Matthew Ben-
son, et al, Police to Enforce Immigration Laws, Arizona Republic 1 (Feb 28, 2007). In
December 2006, Massachusetts-surely among the most liberal, pro-immigrant states--
became the ninth state to enter into such an agreement, only to have the Governor-elect
announce several weeks later that he would reverse that policy. Katie Zezima, New Gov-
ernor To Drop Pact On Immigrants, NY Times A29 (Dec 22, 2006).
57 For an example of possible improvements, see Robert Block, Fighting Terrorism By
Sharing Data, Wall St J A6 (Oct 16, 2006) (detailing the DHS response to state and local
police complaints by improving data-sharing systems).
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C. Employer Sanctions
No commentator on immigration policy-not academics, not
immigrant advocates, not the Bush administration, not the en-
forcement-only enthusiasts who engineered the draconian bill,
HR 4437,58 adopted by the House in December 2005, and cer-
tainly not FAIR and the other restrictionists-claims that em-
ployer sanctions have been effective. There is also widespread
agreement on the reasons for its ineffectiveness: rampant and
low-cost document fraud,59 egregiously lax enforcement by ICE
including only rare inspections and low and infrequent prosecu-
tions and penalties 60 the inevitable consequence of which is to
weaken employer incentives to reject documents that appear fa-
cially valid, even if sham61), a political economy of immigration at
the federal level that countenances high levels of unauthorized
employment, 62 and a frequent public insouciance about conduct
that many consider a victimless offense that strengthens the
economy.63 One is tempted to compare this enforcement failure to
58 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, HR 4437
(Dec 16, 2005).
59 For example, Richard W. Stevenson, Jobs Being Filled by Illegal Aliens Despite
Sanctions, NY Times Al (Oct 9, 1989) ("By all accounts, the law is being undermined
primarily by the spread of fraudulent Social Security cards, 'green cards' signifying alien
residency status and other documents widely accepted by employers as proof of the right
to work.").
60 Fernanda Santos, Day Laborers' Lawsuit Casts Spotlight on a Nationwide Conflict,
NY Times § 1 at 38 (Sept 17, 2006) (noting that local officials blame the proliferation of
day workers on "the federal government's inconsistent enforcement of immigration poli-
cies'); Alwyn Scott, Get-Tough Policy on Employers Has Had Limited Effect, The Seattle
Times (Sept 18, 2006), available at <http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.comcgi-
bintexis.cgi/web/vortexdisplay?slug-imfederall8&date=20060918> (last visited Feb 26,
2007) (noting that "despite some big fines and a few jail terms for employers, the govern-
ment's get-tough effort appears limited."). Recently, however, the number of criminal
prosecutions has increased. DHS: CBP, ICE, USCIS, Migration News (Oct 2006), avail-
able at <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3222-0 20> (last visited Apr 27,
2007) (445 criminal charges against employers in first ten months of FY 06, compared to
25 in FY 02); Rachel L. Swarns, Illegal Immigrants at Center ofNew ID Theft Crackdown,
NY Times A38 (Dec 14, 2006) (discussing massive raids on Swift & Company plants in six
states, which resulted in nearly 1300 arrests, as example of new strategy employed by
DHS).
61 Given the low probability of enforcement, the increased penalties provided in HR
4437 would likely have little marginal effect on employers' incentives to comply.
62 American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Report to the House of
Delegates, Vol 11, No 8 (Apr 15, 2006). See also Andrew Sum, Neeta Fogg, Ishwar Khati-
wada, and Sheila Palma, Foreign Immigration and the Labor Force of the U.S.: The Con-
tribution of New Foreign Immigration to the Growth of the Nation's Labor Force and its
Employed Population, 2000 to 2004 2, 7 (Center for Labor Market Studies July 2004).
63 On the victimless offense aspect, see Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in
Brettell and Hollifield, eds, Migration Theory (cited in note 42).
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Prohibition, with the difference that the arguments favoring the
underlying employer sanctions policy are far stronger than the
policy of Prohibition.64
Professor Wishnie, a leading advocate for immigrant work-
ers, makes an interesting, counterintuitive proposal to eliminate
employer sanctions. He argues that these sanctions, together
with the government's policy-upheld by the Supreme Court in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB 65-to bar undocu-
mented workers' access to many workplace protections, operate
to increase employers' incentives to hire and exploit the undocu-
mented, thus reducing the independence and welfare of all of
their employees, including those who are documented. 66 Wish-
nie's diagnosis of the problem of workplace exploitation is surely
correct to some extent, as the dissenting justices in Hoffman
Plastic warned, but whether his proposed repeal of sanctions is
justified is far less clear. Even weakly enforced sanctions are
likely to have some deterrent effect (since many if not most em-
ployers presumably want to comply with the law), and there are
a number of ways to strengthen sanctions-for example, a sys-
tem of bounties for private enforcement, and a more secure iden-
tity document. 67
Suppose that some states-particularly those on the border
and elsewhere that are under political pressure to weaken the
jobs "magnet" that attracts so many undocumented workers-
were to enact employer sanctions laws and then to enforce them
with the vigor so evidently lacking in ICE. These states might
have much stronger reasons to make employer sanctions effec-
tive than the federal immigration authorities do. The concentra-
tion of the undocumented in a small number of states, a condi-
tion emphasized by Spiro and probably not diminished today, 68
64 See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 1 (2006).
65 535 US 137, 151 (2002) (holding that to allow the NLRB to "award backpay to
illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal
immigration policy").
66 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U Chi Legal F 193.
67 Labor economist Philip Martin points out, for example, that in the UK, "[tihere is a
common perception that laws against hiring unauthorized foreign workers are routinely
ignored," while Sweden, because of "widespread use of personal identification numbers"
and a labor market "well controlled by both private and public organizations," has had
"few problems." Philip Martin, Bordering on Control: Combating Irregular Migration in
North America and Europe 72, 75 (International Organization for Migration 2003).
68 The share of legal immigrants in the six traditional immigrant-receiving states has
declined somewhat, Doris Meissner, et al, Immigration and America's Future: A New
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means that the adverse political and fiscal effects of these con-
centrations are disproportionate in these states. This is most
evident in the fiscal mismatch under which most tax revenues
generated by immigrants, both legal and illegal, flow to Wash-
ington, and many other benefits of immigration (say, lower con-
sumer prices) are also enjoyed nationally, while almost all of the
costs (say, burdens on locally-funded social services, adverse ef-
fects on low-skilled Americans, and immigrant crime) are borne
locally.6 9 In light of this fiscal mismatch, ICE's lassitude-the
immense gap between enforcement rhetoric and actual perform-
ance-becomes that much less surprising.
What can be said against allowing states to impose employer
sanctions that track federal law and might actually be enforced,
thus augmenting these meager federal efforts? For the many pri-
vate lawyers who represent employers or out-of-status immi-
grants and whose success depends in part on their ability to sty-
mie enforcement, the answer is clear: the best employer sanc-
tions regime is one that is weak and ineffective. From a public
interest, rule-of-law perspective, however, there is only one ar-
gument against state employer sanctions that mimic the federal
law: they somehow undermine federal policy. If the plenary
power over immigration means anything, it means that the
states may not adopt policies that are inconsistent with federal
policy. But it is hard to see how state employer sanctions provi-
sions that are carefully drafted to track the federal employer
sanctions law can be inconsistent with it-unless we take inef-
fective enforcement to be the "real" federal policy from which
state law must not deviate.
As suggested by my earlier discussion of the point that opti-
mal enforcement does not necessarily mean full enforcement
(whatever "full" means in this context),70 there is a sense in
which this claim might be true under certain circumstances.
Conceivably, someone might have the temerity and political
courage to argue that the optimal level of enforcement is as close
to zero as ICE's actual enforcement has been, and that this goal
explains and justifies ICE's passivity. But I know of no federal
official who has been willing to take this position with respect to
Chapter 25 (Migration Policy Institute 2006), but not necessarily in the case of the un-
documented. See Don't Fence Us In, The Economist 31, 32 (Oct 21, 2006) (map showing
distribution of unauthorized population).
69 Meissner, et al, Immigration and America's Future at 25 (cited in note 68).
70 Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in Brettell and Hollifield, eds, Migration
Theory (cited in note 42).
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employer sanctions, nor do I think such a position could be de-
fended. More provocatively, one might argue that, regardless of
optimality, the low level of current ICE enforcement is the "real"
federal policy, and that state enforcement more vigorous than
ICE's would be, in that more realistic sense, inconsistent with
federal policy, and thus must be preempted. 71
These arguments, however, are too clever by half. With re-
spect to optimality, the federal government, beginning with the
President of the United States, routinely insists that the level of
unauthorized workers is intolerably high, that something must
be done about it, and that the key to any solution is to turn off
the existing magnet of illegal employment, which can only be
done by strengthening employer sanctions. Judging from the
enormous increases in funding for the Border Patrol over the last
decade, Congress is also convinced of this and has put its money
where its mouth is. The legislation that failed in Congress in
June 2007 also evinced this conviction. Far from favoring federal
preemption, then, this situation cries out for state augmentation
of employer sanctions as a matter of federal policy, not just state
policy.
As for the "real policy" argument, no court is likely to-nor
should it-second-guess a clearly-stated Congressional policy
based solely on the court's suspicion, which would be difficult if
not impossible to verify, that Congress does not really mean
what (the court must concede) it says and is hypocritically pre-
tending otherwise.7 2
There can be no doubt, then, that state employer sanctions
laws consistent with federal policy are legally valid. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's decision in De Canas v Bica73 confirms this va-
lidity. There, the Court rejected a federal preemption defense
and upheld a California statute that imposed sanctions on em-
ployers of undocumented immigrant workers. Although the em-
ployer in De Canas argued that certain provisions of the state
law made it inconsistent with federal policy, the Court held that
71 This interpretation resembles one of the implications of the Supreme Court major-
ity in Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 226 (1982) (substantiality of state goal undermined by
fact that not all undocumented children are actually deported).
72 To my knowledge, the closest the Supreme Court has come to doing this-and it did
not go this far-was its claim in Plyler, 457 US at 225, that there was no "identifiable
congressional policy" to bar undocumented children from public schools, when in fact
Congress's policy to bar undocumented families logically implied such a policy toward
their children, though not stating it in so many words.
73 424 US 351 (1976).
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the law was consistent and furthered the federal purpose of re-
ducing illegal employment of aliens.
For present purposes, the most salient fact about the deci-
sion is that it was rendered in 1976, a decade before Congress
enacted employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). 74 In 1976, the "Texas Proviso," which
since 1952 had immunized employers of unauthorized workers
from liability for "harboring,"75 was still on the books, making it
plausible for the employer to argue that the federal policy
against undocumented immigrant employment was so ineffec-
tive, if not hypocritical, that the California law should be deemed
inconsistent with that policy.
Today, of course, a facially strong federal policy against such
employment is in place, with enforcement provisions that Con-
gress has enhanced over time (albeit without much effect). 76 So
long as the state law tracks the IRCA provisions and merely adds
state sanctions for the federally-proscribed conduct, one can no
longer plausibly argue, unlike in 1976, that the state law would
be inconsistent with, and thus preempted by, this federal pol-
icy.77 De Canas, then, would seem to support my argument a for-
tiori.
IRCA's own preemption provision, however, presents a
stronger argument for preemption. Enacted a decade after De
Canas, INA § 274A(h)(2) preempts "any State or local law impos-
ing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and
similar laws) upon those who employ ... unauthorized aliens."
This provision may supersede De Canas and bar state employer
sanctions taking the form of fines. But its plain text indicates
that IRCA would not preempt (and might even be interpreted to
authorize) sanctions that allow the suspension of business li-
censes for employers of the undocumented--one form that recent
state and local laws (perhaps mindful of this provision) tend to
14 Pub L 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (1986). IRCA amended the Immigration and National-
ity Act, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq (2000).
75 Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 USC § 1324(a)(4) (1982) (establishing
that "for the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal prac-
tices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring'). This harbor-
ing provision has deleted for approximately twenty years and the harboring language has
been shifted to a different section.
76 INA § 274A, codified at 8 USC § 1324(a) (1982).
77 For a somewhat analogous analysis of IRCA's bearing on the continuing validity of
the pre-IRCA decision by the Supreme Court in Plyler v Doe, see Peter H. Schuck, Citi-
zens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship 152 (Westview
Press 1998).
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take.78 Moreover, of the few challenges to state laws on the basis
of IRCA's preemption clause, all of which have sought to invali-
date parts of state workers compensation schemes, none has
been successful.
For instance, in Farmers Brothers Coffee v Workers' Compen-
sation Appeals Board,79 an employer argued that federal law
preempted a California provision making an employee's immi-
gration status, even for illegally-employed aliens, irrelevant to
whether the employer could be liable under the state's labor and
employment laws. The California state court upheld the state
law, concluding that it had not been the "clear [or] manifest pur-
pose of Congress" to preempt state workers' compensation laws.80
Moreover, the court suggested that California's law was entirely
consistent with federal goals since, without the state law, "un-
scrupulous employers would be encouraged to hire aliens unau-
thorized to work in the United States" knowing that if an un-
documented worker were injured, the employer might be able to
escape liability upon a good faith showing that the employer had
relied on ostensibly genuine immigration and work authorization
documents.81 The court also favorably cited Dowling v Slotnik,8 2
a similar case in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut ad-
dressed whether IRCA preempted a state workers' compensation
plan that included undocumented aliens. Like the California
court, the Connecticut court upheld the state scheme on the
ground that if undocumented aliens were excluded, employers
would not have to obtain workers' compensation coverage for
these employees, thereby "creating a financial incentive for un-
scrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers."8 3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals-the only federal court
to consider a challenge under IRCA's express preemption provi-
sion-has reached the same conclusion, validating New York's
workers' compensation law on the ground that it presents no ob-
stacle to the goals of the federal immigration laws.8 4 Hence, the
78 See, for example, City of Hazleton (Pennsylvania), Ordinance 2006-10, City of
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (July 13, 2006), discussed in Part III.
79 133 Cal App 4th 533 (Cal Ct App 2005).
80 Id at 540 (quotation and citation omitted).
81 Id.
82 244 Conn 781 (1998).
83 Id at 796.
84 Madeira v Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc, 469 F3d 219, 239 (2d Cir 2006)
("No provision in IRCA expressly preempts state law providing for injured undocumented
workers to recover compensatory damages, including lost earnings .... Compensatory
damages for personal injury do not reasonably equate to sanctions.").
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text of INA § 274A(h)(2), and the case law interpreting the provi-
sion, support a narrow interpretation of IRCA's preemption
clause. But even if § 274A(h)(2) were somehow interpreted to
preempt licensing sanctions as well, the analysis that I have pre-
sented here would justify repealing, or at least clarifying, that
provision to permit state enforcement of the federal policy or of
its own law mimicking that policy.
The dispositive question, then, is what the courts (and what
I) mean by "mimicking" the federal policy in situations where
Congress has not expressly delegated regulatory or enforcement
authority to the states. (Other judicial formulations include be-
ing "consistent with," "tracking," "mirroring," "reinforcing.") I
address this question below.
III. CONSISTENCY WITH FEDERAL POLICY
According to a 2006 report, hundreds of immigration bills
were considered by more than half the states that year.8 5 In addi-
tion,
[a] set of disparate policies is emerging. Georgia has au-
thorized employer enforcement to combat illegal hiring.
Arizona and Colorado have voted to deny state benefits,
including non-emergency health care, to anyone who can-
not prove legal residence. The governors of Arizona and
New Mexico declared states of emergency to tap special
funds that would buttress inadequate border enforcement.
Ten states are allowing high school graduates who do not
have legal status to attend state colleges and universities
at in-state resident tuition rates.8 6
As noted earlier, some state and local laws and policies adopted
in recent years are intended to promote the interests of immi-
grants, including undocumented ones, and to shield them from
85 Meissner, et al, Immigration and America's Future at 2-7 (cited in note 68). Of the
approximately 300 bills introduced in 2005, 37 became law.
86 Id at 24. See also Laura Parker, Court Tests Await Cities' Laws on Immigrants,
USA Today 3A (Oct 9, 2006) ('2ore than 30 city councils have passed or are considering
local measures aimed at curbing illegal immigrants' access to housing, voting and jobs. At
the state level, lawmakers in 33 states have passed 78 bills, most of them imposing re-
strictions similar to the city measures, the National Conference of State Legislatures
says."); Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, With No Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It, NY
Times, A34 (Dec 7, 2006) (discussing an Altoona, PA, ordinance which "threatens to with-
draw the business licenses of employers and rental licenses of landlords who hire or rent
to illegal immigrants").
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federal enforcement.8 7 Others seek to exclude them. An example
of the latter, which received national media attention, is an ordi-
nance recently adopted by the community of Hazleton, Pennsyl-
vania, that would deny licenses to businesses that employ illegal
aliens, fine landlords $1000 for renting to them, and declare Eng-
lish the city's official language.88
Although the wisdom of many, if not most, of these new laws
is doubtful (or worse),8 9 my purpose here is not to assess their
underlying policies, but rather to consider the general legal prin-
ciples that should apply in determining whether or not they are
preempted by the federal government's plenary power over im-
migration. As just noted, the decisive principle is that they be
consistent with, track, mirror, or reinforce the federal law and
policy. This principle would seem clearly to condemn provisions
like the city of Hazleton's $1000 rental fine that goes beyond em-
ployer sanctions to penalize vendors like landlords. Just as
clearly, it is permissible for states to collaborate with the federal
government in advancing federal immigration objectives. For
example, although the federal government traditionally distrib-
uted food stamps for eligible immigrants, at least 17 states now
supplement the federally-funded benefits by purchasing food
stamps to distribute to some people, including some immigrants,
who are not eligible under federal law.90 Immigration is no dif-
ferent than other fields in which cooperative federalism ar-
rangements of this kind exist.
The DEBI proposal discussed earlier exemplifies a mirroring
initiative in which the state would, pursuant to federally-
established standards, actively collaborate with the administra-
tion of federal immigration law. Similarly, as also discussed ear-
lier, enlisting state officials to aid federal enforcement officials in
the apprehension of undocumented aliens-again, pursuant to
federal standards-illustrates another form of collaboration.
Federal preemption simply does not apply in these situations.
87 See text accompanying notes 21-22.
88 City of Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (cited in note 72). A
temporary restraining order was granted against enforcement, Lozano v City of Hazleton,
459 F Supp 2d 332 (MD Pa 2006), and the court later held, among other things, that the
landlord/tenant provision violated the due process rights of tenants and landlords, Lozano
v City of Hazleton, 2007 WL 2163093 (MD Pa July 26, 2007). See also Julia Preston,
Judge Voids Ordinances On Illegal Immigrants, NY Times A14 (July 27, 2007).
89 See generally Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U Chi Legal F 27 (dis-
cussing local laws and preemption).
90 See Zimmermann and Tumlin, Patchwork Policies at 22 (cited in note 10).
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Other state laws may raise more difficult preemption issues.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have
precisely defined when a state law bearing on immigration is
consistent with, tracks, mirrors, or reinforces federal policy. If
these terms mean anything, however, they must, absent express
preemption, apply to protect state laws that do more than merely
duplicate federal laws by employing their identical language.
They must also-again, absent express preemption-protect
state laws that are consistent with, but less punitive or restric-
tive than, the federal counterpart.9 1
Although the Supreme Court has not precisely defined the
location of these preemption boundaries, it has provided some
guidance. Two cases are most relevant. De Canas v Bica,92 dis-
cussed earlier, upheld a California law that penalized employers
of undocumented immigrant workers even at a time when fed-
eral law did not impose such penalties. Six years later, in Plyler v
Doe, the Court struck down a Texas statute that allowed local
school districts to deny enrollment to noncitizen children of un-
documented aliens and that withheld state funds for the educa-
tion of these children. 93 From these and other preemption cases,
one can discern three basic tests that are satisfied when a state
law is found to track, mirror, reinforce, or be consistent with a
federal law.
First, the state regulation must accord with congressional
intent. This requirement has two aspects. For one thing, the Su-
preme Court stated in De Canas that state regulations must
"give way to paramount federal legislation" if Congress intended
to effect a "complete ouster of state power including state power
to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws."94 The Court
elaborated on this in Plyler, where the Court invalidated a state
law that it distinguished from the one upheld in De Canas, argu-
ing that the state laws challenged in De Canas were upheld be-
cause they broadly "reflected Congress' intention to bar from em-
ployment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission
to work in this country. 95
91 See Joshua J. Herndon, Broken Borders: De Canas v. Bica and the Standards that
Govern the Validity of State Measures Designed to Deter Undocumented Immigration, 12
Tex Hisp J L & Pol 31, 83-84 (2006), quoting Friendly House, CV 04-649 TUC DCB, at 10
(D Ariz 2004).
92 424 US 351 (1976).
93 457 US at 202 (1982).
94 De Canas, 424 US at 357.
95 Plyler, 457 US at 225 (citing De Canas, 424 US at 361).
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If state laws must comport with congressional intent, it fol-
lows that states have greater latitude to act when Congress,
rather than remaining silent, has in fact passed a federal statute
evidencing its policy goals and instruments. 96 Here, a state may
enact its own law pursuing the policies that Congress has mani-
festly promoted.97 Conversely, when Congress is silent, it will be
harder for a state-or a court evaluating the state's enactment-
to divine Congress's policy goals.98
Second, the Supreme Court emphasized in De Canas, and in
Plyler's discussion of De Canas, the requirement that the state
law mirror and promote federal objectives. 99 This kind of rein-
forcement of federal policy would defeat a claim of conflict pre-
emption, although this would not suffice to protect the state law
in a case of field preemption. 00 De Canas also made clear, how-
ever, that establishing field preemption of state immigration law
required an express statement of congressional intent, and that
Congress had not voiced its desire to preempt this entire field.
The Court declared that it would only presume that Congress
96 See Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension (cited in note 51).
97 See De Canas, 424 US at 361 ("[Tjhere is evidence in the form of the 1974 amend-
ments to the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act .. . that Congress intends that
States may, to the extent consistent with federal law, regulate the employment of illegal
aliens.").
98 Even if one were to posit a constitutional presumption against state action in the
field of immigration, the existence of a comprehensive federal immigration statute that
nowhere expressly precludes the possibility of state regulation may be thought to signal
Congress' attempt to modify the constitutional default. Commentators have argued that,
just as Congress, pursuant to its plenary power over Indian tribes, can empower a state
to enact legislation concerning Indian tribes that would otherwise be impermissible, see
Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 US 463,
501 (1979) (upholding against an Equal Protection Clause challenge a Washington law
giving it jurisdiction over Indian territory in the state "enacted in response to a federal
measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians"), Con-
gress may "similarly authorize the states, pursuant to its plenary power over immigra-
tion", Development in the Law - Jobs & Borders: V. The Constitutionality of Immigration
Federalism, 118 Harv L Rev 2247, 2262 (2005), to create legislation concerning immigra-
tion of their own that they would otherwise be disabled from enacting. See also Develop-
ment in the Law at 2264 ("As in the dormant commerce clause context, specific congres-
sional authorization can modify the constitutional default rule that disables the states
from acting.").
99 See Plyler, 457 US at 225 ("As we recognized in De Canas, the States do have some
authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal
objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.").
100 See, for example, United States v Locke, 529 US 89, 115 (2000) ("It is not always a
sufficient answer to a claim of [field] pre-emption to say that state rules supplement, or
even mirror, federal requirements .... 'When Congress has taken the particular subject-
matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be
declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."') (quot-
ing Charleston & Western Carolina R Co v Varnville Furniture Co, 237 US 597, 604
(1915)).
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"intended to oust state authority" upon a demonstration through
the wording or legislative history of a statute that this was "the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."''1 1 In his dissent in Toll
v Moreno,102 Justice Rehnquist stated:
Unquestionably, federal power over immigration and
naturalization is plenary and exclusive. Our decision in
De Canas v. Bica, however, unambiguously forecloses any
argument that this power, either unexercised or as mani-
fested in the Immigration and Nationality Act, preempts
the field of regulations affecting aliens once federal au-
thorities have admitted them into this country. 10 3
Finally, a state law, in order to survive a preemption chal-
lenge, must not interfere or conflict with federal policies. This
principle, like those already discussed, is also mentioned in De
Canas and Plyler. The Supreme Court in Plyler, in striking down
the law in question, stressed that the state classification did not
"operate harmoniously within the federal program,"'1 4 while the
De Canas Court emphasized that Congress had given no indica-
tion that it intended to preclude "even harmonious state regula-
tion."105 State employer sanction laws that operate in the same
manner as the federal law satisfy this test of harmoniousness.
They are like the state labor laws upheld in De Canas, which
"reflected Congress' intention to bar from employment all aliens
except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this
country."'1 6 Such laws only reinforce and further the federal ob-
jective, rather than undermine it. Moreover, the fact that the
federal immigration agency has not objected to state employer
sanction laws (a factor Justice Breyer has identified as relevant
to the preemption issue in a different programmatic context) 10 7
101 De Canas, 424 US at 357-58 (quotation and citations omitted).
102 458 US 1 (1982). In Toll, students of parents who held nonimmigrant alien visas
brought a class action challenging the state-operated University of Maryland admission
and fees policy denying them in-state tuition status. The Court held the policy violated
the Supremacy Clause.
103 Id at 26 (internal citation omitted) (Rehnquist dissenting). See also Huntington,
Constitutional Dimensions (cited in note 51) (interpreting Toll in the same way).
104 Plyler, 457 US at 226,
105 De Canas, 424 US at 358.
106 Plyler, 457 US at 225 (citing De Canas, 424 US at 361).
107 Bates v Dow Agrosciences, 544 US 431, 455 (2005) ("[Ihe federal agency charged
with administering the statute is often better able than our courts to determine the ex-
tent to which state liability rules mirror or distort federal requirements.") (Breyer concur-
ring).
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confirms that such laws do in fact "operate harmoniously within
the federal program."'08
This final requirement, that the state immigration law not
undercut federal goals, is easy enough to state, but it can be dif-
ficult to apply. In Buckman Company v Plaintiffs' Legal Commit-
tee,'09 for example, the Supreme Court considered whether state
law claims of fraud against the FDA conflicted with, and were
therefore impliedly preempted by, federal law. In ruling that the
state claims were indeed preempted, the Court held that "state-
law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the FDA's
responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administra-
tion's judgment and objectives," and that, "[als a practical mat-
ter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the
shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the
burdens facing potential applicants-burdens not contemplated
by Congress in enacting the [federal statutes]."ll° The Court rea-
soned that the federal regulatory requirements could be under-
mined not just by state laws that relaxed those requirements, but
also by state claims that functionally imposed additional re-
quirements beyond those established by the federal agency.
Buckman stands for the proposition, then, that states can
sometimes interfere with federal goals by imposing additional
requirements or sanctions pursuant to those goals. In the Court's
view, the FDA's regulatory requirements had struck a federally-
desired balance between encouraging the development and mar-
keting of new medical devices, on the one hand, and protecting
public safety, on the other-a balance that state law fraud-on-
the-FDA remedies altered in favor of public safety at the expense
of FDA's streamlined regulatory process."' Opponents of state
employer sanctions laws, citing Buckman, could argue that IRCA
struck a careful congressional balance between deterring illegal
immigration and accommodating the demand for undocumented
workers by calibrating the penalties to which employers of such
workers are subject. Congress, in this view, could have treated
such employers either more generously or more punitively, but
for policy reasons settled on the precise balance of federal goals
found in IRCA.
108 Plyler, 457 US at 226.
109 531 US 341 (2001).
110 Buckman, 531 US at 350.
111 But see Desiano v Warner-Lambert Co, 467 F3d 85 (2d Cir 2006) (interpreting
Buckman as not preempting state statute's fraud exception to regulatory compliance
defense).
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The relation between federal and state interests in these two
situations, however, is quite different. In Buckman, no state
could plausibly show that it was not sufficiently protected by the
FDA's requirements. In the immigration context, as we saw ear-
lier, some states do in fact shoulder a disproportionate share of
the burdens imposed by undocumented immigrants due to a
combination of large concentrations of this group within those
states, the fiscal mismatch discussed earlier, and patently inade-
quate federal enforcement. Just as state law penalties for illegal
gun-running may be imposed by states that seek additional de-
terrence because, say, gun-running is especially profitable there,
so may some states have a legitimate interest in calibrating their
balance of benefits and penalties to reflect their assessments of
the local effects, both positive and negative, of undocumented
immigration. 112
Indeed, Congress has explicitly signaled its recognition that
different states may assess these local effects differently by al-
lowing states to award undocumented aliens public benefits be-
yond those otherwise permitted by federal law, 113 and to use
state law enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws.11 4 In
these ways, Congress has enabled states to define optimal deter-
rence levels in state-specific ways. To be sure, Congress has not
(yet) expressly authorized state employer sanctions laws meeting
federal standards as it has done in the areas of state-funded pub-
lic benefits and state law enforcement officials. And this fact can
certainly be used to argue that Congress's policy is to bar state
employer sanctions laws, even those that mirror, reinforce, and
are consistent with the federal scheme. As explained earlier,
however, there is no evidence that Congress endorses such a pol-
icy, and the field preemption case law indicates that the policy
should not be inferred from its silence.
112 Olivas, 35 Va J Intl L at 227 (cited in note 4), is correct that undocumented immi-
grants benefit communities as well as burden them, but my argument that preemption
doctrine should not bar states from playing the roles that I have advocated here does not
depend on an assessment of whether such immigrants on balance benefit or burden those
states.
113 See 8 USC § 1621(d) (2000) ("State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal
aliens for State and local public benefits. A State may provide that an alien who is not
lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for
which such alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) of this Section only
through the enactment of a State law after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted
Aug. 22, 19961 which affirmatively provides for such eligibility").
114 See discussion of § 287(g) agreements in text accompanying note 49-57.
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Congress's tortured failure to enact comprehensive immigra-
tion reform legislation in June 2007 adds one more complexity to
this analysis. 115 Since the legislation would have strengthened
the federal employer sanctions in a variety of ways, one might
argue that the failure to enact the bill should be taken as evi-
dence that Congress was sufficiently content with the status quo
to maintain it, and that new state employer sanction laws should
not be allowed to disturb it. The better and more politically real-
istic view of the situation, however, is that this development has
no bearing on the validity of new state laws that are consistent
with and reinforce existing federal law. Indeed, such state laws
are likely to proliferate in the enforcement void left by the death
of comprehensive federal legislation. 116
This analysis explains why state employer sanction laws
that are consistent with federal employer sanctions policy should
be upheld while the vendor portions of the Hazleton landlord or-
dinance and their ilk should be preempted. Congress has not de-
ployed sanctions against landlords and other vendors as an in-
strument of federal immigration enforcement during IRCA's
more than twenty years. Although vendor sanctions might well
increase the deterrence of undocumented migration, Congress
has provided that even the undocumented, barred from employ-
ment, must not be deprived by states from enjoying the bare ne-
cessities of survival, specifically access to emergency health care
and short-term non-cash disaster relief.117 Having a roof over
one's head seems like such a necessity, whereas employment is
different-or so Congress has decreed. 118
115 See Robert Pear and Carl Hulse, Immigrant Bill Dies in Senate; Defeat for Bush,
NY Times Al (June 29, 2007).
116 Randolph C. Archibold, Arizona Governor Signs Tough Bill on Hiring Illegal Im-
migrants, NY Times A10 (July 3, 2007).
117 42 USC § 5121 (2000) (Stafford Disaster and Relief Act) provides the necessary
statutory authority. FEMA permits this type of relief. FEMA, Disaster Assistance Avail-
able for Non-Citizens (Nov 12, 2005), available at <http://www.fema.gov/news/
newsrelease.fema?id=20541> (last visited May 8, 2007). See also National Immigration
Law Center, Disaster Assistance (revised Sept 2005), excerpted in Guide to Immigrant
Eligibility for Federal Programs (4th ed 2002) (providing overview of programs), available
at <http://www.nilc.org/disaster-assistance/Disaster-Relief.pdf> (last visited May 8,
2007).
118 In late May 2007, a federal district court enjoined enforcement of a Dallas suburb's
ordinance preventing apartment rentals to most illegal immigrants. Texas: Judge Clears
Renting to Illegal Immigrants, NY Times A16 (May 22, 2007).
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CONCLUSION
In the administration and enforcement of immigration pol-
icy, the federal government needs all the help it can get. The
plenary power doctrine clearly authorizes Congress to control the
contours and implementation of this policy, just as is true of
analogous principles in other fields-such as the regulation of
interstate commerce-in which the Constitution has been inter-
preted to delegate broad (and if Congress wishes, exclusive) legis-
lative power to Congress.
As a matter of sound policy, however, Congress should allow
the states, which have in some respects an even greater stake in
the effective administration and enforcement of immigration law
than the federal government does, to play a discrete, carefully
tailored role without jeopardizing legitimate federal interests,
properly understood. My analysis suggests that the states, work-
ing under federal standards, could make important contributions
to the advancement of federal immigration policy in at least
three areas: employment-based admissions, state and local en-
forcement, and employer sanctions. There may well be others. It
is time to take the possibilities of immigration federalism more
seriously.
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